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Informal Formalities: The Government’s
Attempt to Find Families for Orphan Works
by Mark Tratos*
I.

Introduction

Orphan works are the death knell of copyright
law. They have been a growing predicament for the
United States since January 1, 1978 and there has never
been a successful legislative attempt to fix it.1 That is
not to say that there has never been a good proposed
solution to the problem though. The Shawn Bentley
Orphan Works Act of 20082 was the closest the United
States Congress has ever come to solving the problem
of orphan works. However, the proposed solution
would have led to polarizing consequences that affected
previously disregarded elements of U.S. copyright
law. Instead of simply facilitating the eventual use of
orphan works by those engaging in good faith searches
to find the owners of orphan works, the Shawn Bentley
Orphan Works Act would have imposed a system of
“informal formalities” upon copyright owners while
functioning in the current “no formalities” system of
copyright law. The legislation would have reduced
the number of orphan works in the United States by
imposing penalties upon copyright owners, forcing
those owners to complete specific acts or meet certain
requirements in order to ensure their copyrights, while
the remedies for copyright infringement would stay
intact. This solution would fall in line with the basic
foundations of copyright law, but would also force the
United States to question where its priorities lie.
This paper will first describe what orphan works
are, why they exist under current copyright law, and
why they are currently a problem. Second, the paper
will review the legislative history regarding attempted
solutions for the orphan works predicament. The
third portion of the paper will describe how the most
* Mark S. Tratos is a 2012 J.D. candidate at American
University, Washington College of Law. He is an evening student.
He works for the United States Senate. Mark holds a B.A. in
Economics and Ancient Studies from Washington University in St.
Louis.
1. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541
(1976) (informing the public that the Copyright Act of 1976 was
to become law on January 1, 1978); Shawn Bentley Orphan Works
Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2008); Orphan Works Act of
2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. (2008); Copyright Modernization
Act of 2006, H.R. 6052, 109th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2006); Orphan
Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. (2006).
2. S. 2913
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recent attempt at orphan works legislation, the Shawn
Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, would have
created a new type of copyright formality called “the
informal formality,” and how that would have impacted
copyright owners. The fourth portion of the paper will
address possible reactions to the implementation of
such a law. The fifth and final section will discuss why
such legislation is necessary and how a few changes to
the Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008 could
lead to a more acceptable solution to the orphan works
problem.
II. Why do Orphan Works Exist?
The term “orphan work” describes a situation
where an individual wanting to use a work in a way
that would require prior permission from the copyright
owner is not able to locate or identify the original
owner.3 The only two requirements to be an orphan
work are that a work must be copyrighted, which has
become significantly more likely since the elimination
of copyright formalities, and that the owner of such a
work must be an individual who cannot be located.4
These two simple requirements, when met, cause
problems that only federal legislation can fix.5
Orphan works in the United States are the byproduct of Congress’s war against copyrighted works
prematurely entering the public domain and the
international community’s push for stronger creator
rights.6 Orphan works first appeared on January 1,
3. U.S. Copyright Office, Report on Orphan Works 1 (2006),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.
pdf (traditionally in the form of a license for an exclusive right).
4. Id. at 1-2.
5. Letter from Senators Orrin G. Hatch and Patrick J. Leahy
to Marybeth Peters, Registrar of Copyrights (January 5, 2005),
reprinted in U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3; Letter from
Representative Lamar Smith to Marybeth Peters, Registrar of
Copyrights (January 7, 2005), reprinted in U.S. Copyright Office,
supra note 3; Letter from Representative Howard L. Berman to
Marybeth Peters, Registrar of Copyrights (January 10, 2002),
reprinted in U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3; U.S. Copyright
Office, supra note 3, at 15-17; see The Authors Guild v. Google,
Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The question of
who should be entrusted with guardianship of orphan books . . .
safeguards are matters more appropriately decided by Congress than
through an agreement among private, self-interested parties”).
6. Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Balancing the Interest
of Copyright Owners and Users: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
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1978, the same day that the Copyright Act of 1976
became effective.7 The problem became worse in
1989 when the United States agreed to the terms of
the Berne Convention.8 These pieces of legislation
eliminated the long-held requirements (or “formalities”)
for copyright protection in the U.S.9
Copyright formalities were conditions or acts
independent from simply creating the work required of
a work’s creator to ensure that the work was protected
by copyright.10 If someone wanted to ensure a
monopoly on the use of his work and retain the ability
to license the exclusive rights associated with that work,
he would stringently adhere to the formalities or risk
his work entering the public domain forever.11 This
required a number of actions, such as publishing the
work, placing notice of copyright protection upon
the work, depositing the work with the Library of
Congress, renewing the term of copyright protection,
and recording the transfer of exclusive rights.12 One
formality almost singlehandedly caused the orphan
works problem however.
While U.S. copyright law does not require the
registration of an author’s work to gain copyright
protection, it is required if an owner wishes to enforce
their rights in the United States.13 In addition, for
a rights-holder to recover attorney’s fees or statutory
damages, she must register the work before the
infringement occurs.14 This formality incentivized
the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of H. Com. on
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1-2 (2008) (Statement of Howard M.
Berman, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Property, of the House Committee on the
Judiciary); see U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 3.
7. See Letter from Senators Orrin G. Hatch and Patrick
J. Leahy to Marybeth Peters, Registrar of Copyrights (January
5. 2005), reprinted in U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3 (“A
principal concern is that the current Copyright Act might be
creating a class of ‘orphan works’ – works for which no copyright
owner can be found, and this which permission to use or to adapt
these works cannot be obtained.”).
8. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, art. 5(2), as revised on July 24. 1971, 1161
U.N.T.S. 30, 35 available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
UNTS/Volume%201161/volume-1161-I-18338-English.pdf
(eliminating all formalities which could prevent a creator form
obtaining a copyright).
9. Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Balancing the Interest
of Copyright Owners and Users: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of H. Com. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 20 (2008) (Statement of Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyright); see U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 3.
10. See U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 60.
11. Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Mandatory
Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 Colum. J.L. &
Arts 311, 321-22 (2009).
12. Id. at 315-18.
13. The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2008).
14. Id. § 412.

copyright owners to register their works promptly,
even though it was not required to receive a copyright
after 1909.15 Registration would in turn encourage
individuals wishing to use the work to search the
registry of copyrighted works at the Copyright
Office, which serves as the pre-eminent database of
copyrighted works.16 This concept relies on the idea
that a search of the U.S. Copyright registry can yield
fruitful results.17 Registration of a work also benefits
the owner by serving as a prima facie presumption
of copyright validity if the author registers the work
within five years of its publication.18
The formalities that were pervasive throughout the
U.S. system of copyrights eventually found themselves
extinct after Congress eliminated formalities in four
distinct ways. First, the Copyright Act of 1976
granted copyright protection upon the fixation of the
work, a change from the previous requirement that
an author publish her work with notice or register an
unpublished work before it could receive protection.19
Creators now simply produce their work in order
to receive copyright protection.20 Second, the 1976
Act21and later the Copyright Term Extension Act,22
extended the term of copyright ownership to the life
of the author plus an additional seventy years.23 The
term of copyright protection has potentially tripled
and the creator is not required to take any additional
steps. Third, the alteration and extension of the term
of copyright eliminated the renewal requirement found
in the Copyright Act of 1909.24 Fourth, the Berne
15. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §§ 2, 10
(1909) (holding that publication of a work with notice would
suffice requirements for copyright protection).
16. Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Proof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696,
700-01 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the awarding of damages that
are contingent on registration promotes the early registration of
copyrights).
17. But cf. John Tehranian, The Emperor Has No Copyright:
Registration, Cultural Hierarchy, and the Myth of American Copyright
Militancy, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1399, 1430-31 (2009)
(acknowledging that search reports from the U.S. Copyright office
will be non-interpretive and search criteria may not accurately
identify the work or owner sought out).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2008).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 102(2008); Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L.
No. 60-349, §§ 2, 10 (1909).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (noting that something will receive
copyright protection if it is an original work fixed in a tangible
medium).
21. See Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302(a) (1976) (extending the
term of copyright ownership from 56 years to the life of the author
plus 50 years).
22. See Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b), (d) (2008) (extending
copyright protection an additional 20 years).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
24. See U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3 at 3; Copyright
Act of 1909, Pub. L. 60-349 § 24.
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Convention, agreed to by the United States in 1989,
eliminated the formal requirements that creators had to
meet both to receive copyright protection and exercise
their exclusive rights associated with copyright, which
included the visual notice requirements upon a work.25
By the new millennium, copyright law protected works
in the United States upon fixation, for longer periods,
with a much smaller chance for the work entering the
public domain, and without requiring identification
that the work was actually protected. These four factors
suddenly made it much harder to discern whether a
work was protected by a copyright.
The abolition of formalities was only one factor
in the rise of orphan works. Despite the fact that
individuals now had to assume any work they
encountered was protected,26 copyright owners of those
works could still be identified, meaning the work is
not an orphan work.27 The methods an individual
can use to identify the owner of a copyrighted work,
whether in the U.S. or abroad, have never yielded
sufficient or wholly accurate results.28 The U.S.
Copyright Office Registry, the singular governmentapproved database available to individuals wanting
to determine who controls the rights to a work, does
not provide an effective way to identify the owner of
a specific copyrighted work.29 Since a registry search
may not provide the necessary information sought to
identify a copyright owner, an individual must find
the information in other ways, assuming the copyright
owner registered the work in the first place.30
25. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, art. 5(2), as revised on July 24. 1971, 1161
U.N.T.S. 30, 35 available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
UNTS/Volume%201161/volume-1161-I-18338-English.pdf
(noting that the requirement for some form of notice upon any
copyrighted work was a formality which would not comply with the
treaty).
26. See U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 15-16 (noting
that automatic copyright protection could exist in cases where
circumstances lead people to believe the work has no commercial
value).
27. See id. at 1 (recognizing one of the requirements of an
orphan work is that the creator or rights-holder cannot be found).
28. See also id. at 32-34 (determining that factors like the
cost of a search, the lack of identifying information on a work, the
general obscurity of the work, and the country of the works origin
will hamper a potential licensor’s search or decision to conduct a
search).
29. See Tehranian, supra note 17, at 1430-31 (acknowledging
that search reports from the U.S. Copyright office will be noninterpretive and search criteria may not accurately identify the work
or owner sought out).
30. When conducting an electronic search of the Copyright
Office’s public catalogue, search entries will often provide you with
a title of the work, the type of work, the year of the work’s creation,
and the date of the work’s publication. The search will not provide
you with any contact information in order to make contact with the
author. The search entry will also no provide you with an example
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Although the lack of effective search methods and
the current insufficiencies of the Copyright Office’s
Registry have made it hard to identify the owners
of copyrights, current technology and the culture
surrounding digital works have made the process
of identifying rights-holders even more difficult.
Recent technological developments have facilitated
the availability of works in digital formats and the
ability to copy those works multiple times over.31 Our
current technology-heavy, instant gratification culture
encourages the distribution of copies to one or two
friends, who in turn disperse their copies in similar
ways.32 These copies often contain no information
that a searcher could use to identify the author or
rights-holder of the work.33 This is partially because of
digital piracy and partially because of the elimination
of the notice formality from U.S. copyright law.34 The
problem is particularly pervasive in digital copies of
photographs.35 Current technologies allow users to
encounter works in a multitude of ways that often
afford no opportunity to identify the author or rightsholder of the work. With no indication of the identity
of the copyright owner, potential licensors are forced
to use the U.S. Copyright Registry and their own
intuition to find the owner, both of which often prove
to be unsuccessful.36 This is how orphan works came
to be.
III. Why are Orphan Works a Problem?
Both Congress and the Copyright Office believe
that the orphan works problem has had a dramatic
impact on the economy.37 The copyright system in
the United States has created a market around the
of the work to ensure the work or author searched for is the work or
author found.
31. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Finding New Paths
Through the Internet: Content and Copyright, 12 Tul. J. Tech.
& Intell. Prop. 145, 146-47 (2009) (recognizing that the
Internet facilitates transactions outside the visible market, making
transactions hard to monitor and control).
32. See id. at 147.
33. U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 23.
34. Id. at 26, 41-42.
35. Id. at 24.
36. See Tehranian, supra note 17, at 1430-31 (acknowledging
that search reports from the U.S. Copyright office will be noninterpretive and search criteria may not accurately identify the work
or owner sought out).
37. See Letter from Senators Orrin G. Hatch and Patrick
J. Leahy to Marybeth Peters, Registrar of Copyrights (January 5,
2005), reprinted in U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3; Letter
from Representative Lamar Smith to Marybeth Peters, Registrar of
Copyrights (January 7, 2005), reprinted in U.S. Copyright Office,
supra note 3; Letter from Representative Howard L. Berman to
Marybeth Peters, Registrar of Copyrights (January 10, 2002),
reprinted in U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3; U.S. Copyright
Office, supra note 3, at 15-17.
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control of exclusive rights to a copyrighted work.38 If
an individual wants to exercise the rights to a particular
work she does not own, she seeks out the owner of that
work and negotiates a contract or license to use the
work.39 Owners and potential licensors determine the
value of the rights to that particular work, thus shaping
the market and pushing the economy forward.40 This
system of negotiations and eventual transactions
necessitates, however, that an individual can find the
author or rights-holder of a work.41 When searchers
cannot find the rights-holders, the copyright market
suffers.42
The fact that a work is an orphan does not mean
that people do not still want to acquire the rights to
its use. In fact, the growth of digital works and the
Internet has increased the demand for the acquisition of
rights from a variety of sources.43 When individuals are
unable to discover or locate the author or rights-holder
of a work they wish to exploit, a potential licensor is
forced to make a serious decision: does she use the
work without permission and risk an infringement
lawsuit,44 or, does a she simply abandon her desire to
use the work, choosing not to risk liability?45 Potential
licensors often choose not to use the work.46 This
fear of lawsuits has been incredibly debilitating to
the market for copyright licenses and to the nation’s
heritage.47
The inability to use orphan works without the fear
of infringement suits has affected the entire market of

38. U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 15.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 1.
42. See also Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Balancing the
Interest of Copyright Owners and Users: Hearing before the Subcomm.
on the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 19-20 (2008) (statement of Marybeth
Peters, Register of Copyright) (asserting that if there is no copyright
owner, there is no beneficiary of the copyright terms and that is an
enormous waste in the copyright market).
43. C.f. Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 153-54 (asserting that
the internet is now seen as a place for new artists to be discovered,
in addition to being a place where a large amount of piracy of
unattributed works occurs).
44. See 154 Cong. Rec. S3437-38 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2008)
(statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch); see also 154 Cong. Rec. S340506 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2008) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy).
45. Id.
46. U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 15.
47. See Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Balancing the
Interest of Copyright Owners and Users: Hearing before the Subcomm.
On the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, supra note 42 (asserting that when a copyright owner
cannot be identified and potential users abandon the work, several
productive projects which may be beneficial to our national heritage
are lost); id.

potential copyright licensors.48 The Report on Orphan
Works from the U.S. Copyright Office identified
four general types of users who most often wanted to
make use of orphan works, ranging from individuals
wanting to incorporate orphan works into their own
large-scale creations to individuals who are “small-time”
enthusiasts or who wish to obtain the work for private
uses.49 All of these potential users have the ability to
bring new life or new audiences to works, but many
decide against using the work when they consider the
potential liability standing in their way.50 Potential
users of orphan works were unable to conduct business
in the market of copyright licenses and therefore
Congress proposed orphan-work legislation.51
IV. Orphan Works Legislation
There have been a few recent attempts to pass
legislation to correct the orphan works problem.
Orphan works legislation was first proposed in the
United States House of Representatives in 200652, but
the Orphan Works Act of 2006 never made it out of
the House Judiciary Committee53. After it was clear
the legislation would never receive enough votes on the
floor of the House, supporters subsequently inserted
the substance of the 2006 Act into the Copyright
Modernization Act of 200654, which was stuck in
committee.55 Attempts at an orphan works solution
did not die though, as legislation reemerged in 2008
through two different bills.56 The Orphan Works Act
of 2008 appeared and subsequently died in the House
of Representatives,57 and the Shawn Bentley Orphan
Works Act of 2008 (S. 2913), which originated in
48. See Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Balancing the
Interest of Copyright Owners and Users: Hearing before the Subcomm.
On the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, supra note 42 (asserting that when a copyright owner
cannot be identified and potential users abandon the work, several
productive projects which may be beneficial to our national heritage
are lost)
49. U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 36-40 (asserting
that the categories of proposed uses are “uses by subsequent
creators,” “large-scale access uses,” “enthusiast uses,” and “private
uses”).
50. See 154 Cong. Rec. S3405-06 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2008)
(statement of Patrick J. Leahy) (“[O]rphan works . . . often languish
unseen, because those who would like to bring them to light, and
to the attention of the world, fear the prospect of prohibitively
expensive statutory damages.”).
51. See S. 2913; H.R. 5889; H.R. 6052; H.R. 5439.
52. H.R. 5439.
53. See Yeh, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33392, Orphan Works
in Copyright Law 8 (2010).
54. H.R. 6052 (appearing in Title 2).
55. See Brian T. Yeh, supra note 53.
56. Alessandra Glorioso, Note, Google Books: An Orphan
Works Solution?, 38 Hofstra L. Rev. 971, 980 (2010).
57. Id.; H.R. 5889.
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the Senate and was passed by the higher house, was
eventually lost in House committee.58 The Shawn
Bentley Orphan Works Act is the focus of this paper
not only because the bill represented the culmination
of changes deemed necessary after considering the
previous legislative attempts,59 but also because of the
likelihood that a bill resembling the Shawn Bentley
Orphan Works Act of 2008 could be passed by the
United States Senate again, and possibly the House of
Representatives in future.
Congress introduced the Shawn Bentley Act of
2008 (S.2913) to solve the problem of orphan works.
S.2913’s primary goal, as agreed on by the bill’s
sponsors, was to identify the owners of such works.60
By encouraging the identification of the authors or
rights-holders of the orphan works, the Act would
facilitate the licensing of these works to interested
parties.61 The Act was designed to keep the most
basic tenets of U.S. copyright law intact, ensuring
that a rights-holder may still benefit from their work
as they did previously.62 With these two aims in
mind, legislators attempted to re-insert thousands of
previously unidentifiable and unusable works back into
the licensing market.63 The way in which the Shawn
Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008 intended to do
58. S. 2913; see Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Balancing
the Interest of Copyright Owners and Users: Hearing before the
Subcomm. On the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual property of H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 42.
59. See also Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Balancing the
Interest of Copyright Owners and Users: Hearing before the Subcomm.
On the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual property of H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, supra note 42, at 24-25 (statement of Marybeth
Peters, Register of Copyrights) (incorporating changes designed to
protect visual artists, to document searches, to define “reasonable
compensation,” and to address the availability of attorney’s fees).
60. See also U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 93 (“Any
system to deal with orphan works should seek primarily to make
it more likely that a user can find the relevant owner in the first
instance”); 154 Cong. Rec. S3437-38 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2008)
(statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch); 154 Cong. Rec. S3405-06
(daily ed. Apr. 24, 2008) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy).
61. See 154 Cong. Rec. S3405-06 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2008)
(statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy) (believing that the identification
of rights-holders will help the owners receive compensation).
62. See id. (noting that the act was not designed to change
the basic premise of copyright law, that if you use the copyrighted
works of others, you must compensate them for such use); see
also Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Balancing the Interest of
Copyright Owners and Users: Hearing before the Subcomm. On the
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual property of H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, supra note 42, at 21 (statement of Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights) (“we do not wish to unduly prejudice the
legitimate rights of the copyright owner by depriving him of the
ability to assert infringement or hinder his ability to collect an
award that reflects the true value of his work”).
63. 154 Cong. Rec. S3437-38 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2008)
(statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch).
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this, however, would prove to be truly controversial,
challenging the very tenets upon which U.S. and
international copyrights currently rely.
The drafters wrote the Shawn Bentley Orphan
Works Act of 2008 from the perspective of a rightsholder of an orphan work, with Section 2 of the Act
dealing the most damage to said rights-holders. The
section informed the rights-holder that there was a
limitation placed upon the remedies available to them
if someone infringed their work, should the Act deem it
an orphan.64 Section 2 proposed that remedies would
be limited if the alleged infringer “performed and
documented a qualifying search, in good faith, to locate
and identify the owner of the infringed copyright;
and was unable to locate and identify the owner of
the infringed copyright.”65 After a more meticulous
description of what a qualifying search would entail,
the Act described the limitations upon remedies,
allowing the rights-holder to receive only “reasonable
compensation” from the guilty infringer.66 Rightsholders received a small allowance of injunctive relief,
dependent on whether the infringer paid “reasonable
compensation” to the owner of the orphan work upon
identification of the owner or if infringement litigation
occurred.67 Therefore, while the Act proposed a way
for potential licensors to identify the owners of orphan
works68, it also notified those same owners that the Act
limited their enforcement rights and ability to recoup
damages, should they remain unidentified when an
individual used their work.
Because of this shift, the Act required potential
infringers to perform a search for the rights-holders in
order to escape the liability for using an orphan work.69
To conduct a “qualifying search” for the owner of the
work, the individual would undertake a “diligent effort
that is reasonable under the circumstances to locate
the owner of the infringed copyright prior to, and at
the time reasonably proximate to, the infringement.”70
The diligent effort to find the rights-holders required
a minimum of 5 steps to be taken: (1) a search of all
Copyright Office records available to the public; (2) a
search of all reasonably available sources of copyright
owner and licensor information; (3) the use of all
appropriate technologies, publications, and experts to
locate the owner; (4) the use of appropriate internet
databases to locate the owner; (5) and performance of
64. S. 2913 § 2.
65. Id. § 2(b)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(II).
66. Id. § 2(c)(1)(A).
67. Id. § 2(c)(2)(A).
68. 154 Cong. Rec. S3,437-38 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2008)
(statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch).
69. S. 2913 § 2(b)(2)(A)(i)
70. Id.
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any other actions when searching that could be deemed
“reasonable and appropriate” when considering the
facts that have been discovered during the course of the
investigation.71 The Copyright Office shaped the search
through a statement of recommended practices,72 which
attempted to hone the search for the rights-holder, as
legislators rationalized that different search parameters
would prove effective for different types of works.73
The limitations on remedies in the Shawn Bentley
Orphan Works Act of 2008 applied to both monetary
relief and injunctive relief. The monetary damages
previously available to a registered work include actual
damages, statutory damages, costs and attorney’s
fees.74 These damages would no longer be available to
the rights-holder if the infringer met the “qualifying
search” requirements.75 Instead, the rights-holder
only recovered “reasonable compensation,” which was
intended by the Copyright Office and legislators to
be the market value of the copyright license if they
had engaged in negotiations of a license before the
infringement began.76 Even then, the Act placed the
burden upon the copyright owner, not the infringer, to
prove that the work in question was worth market value
at the time of infringement.77 If a copyright owner
wished to pursue injunctive relief upon the infringer of
her copyright, the Act required stringent limitations.
Infringers who successfully met the “qualifying search”
requirement of subsection (b) recovered monetary
damages for the injury that the injunction would
cause.78 In addition the Act provided that, should an
infringer meet the requirements of subsection (b) and
pay reasonable compensation to the copyright owner
in a timely manner, the copyright owner would not
have the right to pursue injunctive relief of any kind.79
Through the limitation of monetary and injunctive
71. Id. § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii).
72. Id. § 2(b)(2)(A)(iii).
73. Id.; see also U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 10910.
74. 17 U.S.C. §§ 504-05 (2006).
75. S. 2913 § 2(c)(1)(A).
76. Id.§ 2(c)(1)(B) (holding that reasonable compensation
must not be paid if the infringer is a “nonprofit educational
institution, museum, library, archives, or public broadcasting entity”
or if the infringer proves the infringement was not done to receive a
commercial advantage, the infringement was educational in nature,
or if the infringers stopped infringement upon receiving a notice of
claim of infringement); U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 116.
77. U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 116-17 (noting
that reasonable compensation, in many cases, may be found to
be zero or royalty-free because similar transactions in the market
support such a finding).
78. S. 2913 § 2(c)(2)(A) (holding that the harm to the
infringer must be noted by the court before any injunctive relief can
be granted).
79. Id. § 2(c)(2)(B)-(C).

relief for the copyright owner, the Shawn Bentley
Orphan Works Act would have created, in essence,
a compulsory license for the exclusive rights of any
orphan work. As a result of the Act, either the infringer
would have found the owner of the orphan work
through a qualifying search and hopefully negotiated
a reasonable license, or the infringer would have been
unable to find the owner and would have used the work
anyway. If someone used the work without finding
the owner he or she might eventually pay the same
reasonable cost of a license, but only if the owner of the
orphan work later identified themselves or sued. The
only possible options that a copyright owner would
have had to prevent his or her work from being used
would be to deny the grant of a license when asked by
potential users or make sure they could be found by
potential users conducting a diligent, qualifying search.
In either case, an individual must be able to identify
and locate the owner of the copyright. The desire to
find the owners of orphan works started to look more
like legislators’ desire to use orphan works with or
without the owner’s permission.80
Members of Congress threw the gauntlet. They
legislated a procedure for the potential infringer to
follow with the eventual destination being a copyright
license. Individuals would know exactly what stops
they must take along the route: searching the records
of the copyright office, using experts, scouring internet
databases, and so on. In fact, the odds were better to
get a license if you performed a reasonable search and
did not find the rights-holder because at worst, you
would end up paying reasonable compensation for the
license, and that was only if the owner of the orphan
work appeared. So when Congress tried to force
authors and rights-holders to grant unwanted licenses,
Congress said those same authors and rights-holders
must do all they can to make sure their works do not
become orphans. To do that, creators and rightsholders must purposefully place themselves and their
works in the public, assuring themselves that anyone
who would wish to license their work would find them,
and thus retaining the ability to bring the weight of the
United States Judicial System upon infringers.
V.

The Creation of the Informal Formality

As legislators and the U.S. Copyright Office
observed the problems that orphan works were
causing in the copyright market, they were left with a
80. U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 8 (asserting that
the first goal of orphan works legislation was to create a system that
would make it more likely for users to find a relevant rights-holder
and negotiated a license agreement and recognizing that the second
goal was to encourage use of orphan works only when the rightsholder could not be found).
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predicament. Were they to re-impose the formalities
that originally prevented the existence of orphan works,
or were they to kneel before the orphan works problem
and accept the mess as the new standard? The Shawn
Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008 was an attempt to
navigate between the two extremes. Legislators alleged
it was not attempting to create formalities for copyright
owners to meet; however, they evidently thought that
they must put some requirements in place to prevent
orphan works from overrunning the market.81 The
concept of informal formality emerged.
An informal formality, as this author defines it, is
an action taken by the owner of a copyright to ensure
he do not lose any rights associated with that copyright.
Unlike formalities however, copyright law does not
specifically require or even articulate these actions. An
owner will not necessarily lose his rights if he does not
complete the formalistic task. Instead, a copyright
owner can choose to take this extra step to ensure that
there will never be a circumstance in which he will not
lose his rights.
Before the creation of the informal formality
however, both the legislators and the U.S. Copyright
Office knew they could not transgress the international
treaty limits.82 The Berne Convention, as well as
other international agreements83, has prevented the
imposition of formalities upon foreign authors.84
Specifically, the Convention prevents the imposition of
any requirement, other than the creation of the work
itself, to ensure an author retains a copyright.85 Most of
the countries that agreed to the Berne Convention no
longer require creators to comply with any copyright
formality.86 However, the Berne Convention does not
suspend all formalities.87 There is a notable difference
81. U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 61 (“Any
legislative solution to the orphan works problem, must not require
an author to comply with formalities if failure to comply with those
formalities would result in the author becoming unable to enjoy or
exercise copyright in the work.”).
82. Id.
83. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Apr. 15. 1994, art. 9.1 Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81,
87 (1994); World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright
Treaty art. 3, Dec 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65, 69 (1997); World
Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms
Treaty art. 20, Dec. 20, 1996 36 I.L.M. 76, 86 (1997).
84. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, art. 5(2), as revised on July 24. 1971, 1161
U.N.T.S. 30, 35 available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
UNTS/Volume%201161/volume-1161-I-18338-English.pdf
(noting that the Berne Convention does not apply to a country’s
imposition of copyright formalities upon its own creators).
85. Id.
86. See Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 313.
87. Id. at 314
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between formalities that affect ownership of a copyright
or rights therein and formalities affecting whether a
copyright exists or whether a rights-holder can enforce
his rights.88 Those differences are the reason that
sections 411 and 412 of the Copyright Act of 1976 still
exist. U.S. Copyright law does not force individuals to
register their work with the Copyright Office in order
to receive a copyright.89 Instead, registration gives
copyright owners the power to enforce their copyright
and to receive different types of monetary damages
through infringement litigation.90 There has been
speculation as to the legality of the relief limitations
imposed by U.S. copyright law in the face of the
Berne Convention.91 Berne states that any copyright
registration system that affects or alters substantive,
exclusive rights granted through copyright too closely
resembles a formality.92 If a copyright owner cannot
pursue statutory damages or attorney’s fees in an
infringement action, little would be done to encourage
copyright enforcement amongst rights-holders.93
Despite such a reading, the United States has continued
to require registration of a work to commence
infringement litigation. It is amongst this quagmire of
international conventions and statutory law that the
Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008 attempted
to make its mark.
Despite the fact that the goal of orphan works
legislation was to identify the owners of orphan works,
the legislation was a roadmap for potential infringers,
charting a course on how to search for the owners of
orphan works, with the destination being the use of
the orphan work in almost every situation. In order
to prevent such uncontrolled use of orphan works,
copyright owners would have to make sure that they are
along the side of the road, waving down each potential
infringer, notifying them of who the rights-holder was.
This begins with the diligent effort requirement of the
“quality search.”94
The first requirement of the diligent effort was an
internet search of the publically available records of
the Copyright Office, assuming that the work provides
enough identifying information on which a potential
licensor can base a search.95 The registration of a work
88. Id.
89. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2011).
90. Id. §§ 411-12.
91. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, art. 5, Sept. 9, 1886, (amended on Sept. 28, 1979),
S. Treaty, Doc. No. 99-27 (1986) (“The enjoyment and the exercise
of these rights shall not be subject to any formality”).
92. U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 61; Tehranian,
supra note 17, at 1439 (including significant remedies).
93. Tehranian, supra note 17, at 1439.
94. S. 2913 § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii).
95. Id. § (b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)(aa).

Fall 2011

Mark Tratos
with the Copyright Office would be a potentially
necessary step if copyright owners wished to be found
by potential licensors. The lack of comprehensive
results that often occurs after a search of the Copyright
Registry, however, made this step unlikely to be
fruitful.96 The creator of a work would not only have
to register their work, but also provide a title, name, or
keyword that sufficiently described the work in hopes
that a potential licensor would consider the same title,
name, or keyword when they search for the work. If
both the owner and the potential licensor consider the
same terms, the likelihood of a successful search of
the Copyright Office’s public catalog becomes more
reasonable. While such searches often prove to be
fruitless, registering with the Copyright Office would
increase the likelihood that a potential licensor would
find the creator of a work. Taking such an opportunity
would result in either a potential licensor finding the
owner or a court finding that a diligent effort was not
made by the infringer to try to locate the owner, thus
securing a plethora of monetary and injunctive relief
for the rights-holder.
The second diligent effort requirement was a
search of sources of copyright ownership, authorship
information, and if possible, licensor information.97
While this search was limited to sources reasonably
available to the potential licensor, the criterion
did encapsulate a plethora of potential sources of
information. This search requirement included the
Copyright Card Catalog at the Library of Congress.98
In addition, the vagueness of the definition of “source
of copyright authorship and information” could
have allowed the courts to impose numerous other
potential searches of information sources upon a
licensor, dependent upon the facts of the case. The
Copyright Office even predicted that orphan works
legislation would develop privately owned and operated
sources of copyright authorship information.99 If
such sources appeared, one source, if not more, could
become de facto components of a diligent search for
potential licensors.100 The growth of private sources of
copyright information and the possible creation of de
facto components would lead to creators and copyright
owners finding included indentifying information
within those sources. By encouraging a rights-holder
96. See Tehranian, supra note 17, at 1430-31 (acknowledging
that search reports from the U.S. Copyright office will be noninterpretive and search criteria may not accurately identify the work
or owner sought out).
97. S. 2913 § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)(bb)
98. Circular 23: The Copyright Card Catalog and the Online
Files of the Copyright Office 1 (Nov. 2010), available at http://www.
copyright.gov/circs/circ23.pdf
99. U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 103-04.
100. Id.

to associate their works with these sources, simply in
hopes that the rights-holders would be more easily
found, we can assume the rate of publication of works
will rise. While publication of a work has not been a
requirement of copyright protection in many years101,
it suddenly may be a way of ensuring that potential
licensors find the creators.
The third diligent effort requirement was the use of
appropriate technological tools, printed publications,
and expert assistance when conducting a search for
a copyright owner.102 This requirement opened the
reasonable search criteria for a potential licensor beyond
that of the Copyright Office’s resources. Resources like
internet search engines, address directories, telephone
directories, and even ownership information appearing
on the orphan works themselves were potential areas
requiring reasonable search before limitations could
be placed on the liability of a copyright infringer.103
The growth of high-speed internet, e-mail, and search
engines has potentially made it much easier for a
rights-holder to be found.104 If a potential licensor
was required to use the internet to search for the
owner of an orphan work, there would be impetus for
a work owner to then put their work online. Online
publication is not required by any statute or regulation,
but it would increase the likelihood of finding that the
owner of any copyrighted work. This requirement is
not limited to online publications. The requirement to
search printed publications could lead to the growth of
copyrighted works directories, potentially functioning
like the Copyright Office Card Catalogue. While
the existence of such publications would not require
rights-holders to place themselves and their works in
the publication, such opportunities could have given
creators the best chance of retaining all of their rights
to monetary and injunctive relief. Should individuals
become experts in locating the rights-holders of orphan
works, would it not also be prudent for the creators
of orphan works to make themselves known to such
experts? Owners should at least associate themselves
with or publish themselves within the resources used by
those experts so that licensors can identify them.
The fourth diligent effort requirement was the most
controversial. This criterion told potential licensors to
make “use of appropriate databases, including databases
that are available to the public through the Internet.”105
101. Publication has not been a requirement for copyright
protection since the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976 on
January 1, 1978. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90
Stat. 2541 (1976)
102. S. 2913 § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)(cc).
103. U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 77-78.
104. Id. at 104.
105. S. 2913 § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)(dd).
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This requirement acknowledged the potential faults of
the Copyright Office Registry, in that a search of the
registry may not provide sufficient results.106 Instead,
the federal legislators preferred to release a potential
tidal wave of databases upon rights-holders and
licensors.107 The Copyright Office even acknowledged
that the operation of a singular registration system or
database would be cost ineffective.108 The existence
of a singular copyright database or registry could also
lead to disagreements between system administrators
and rights-holders choosing to enter their work in the
database, as rights-holders may believe that the database
is unable to provide the sufficient resources to chronicle
and document the work.109 Instead, the Copyright
Office suggested that multiple registries would solve
the orphan works problem, and the fourth requirement
encapsulated all those databases in the reasonable
search.110 These would most likely have been private
registries, as the private market has better capabilities
to market their products to potential rights-holders and
desired licensors.111 While the Copyright Office and
legislators desired to distance themselves as much as
possible from mandatory registration requirements,112
they still required the search of registries by those
looking to obtain licenses to exclusive rights.113 If
copyright owners wished to protect their ability to
receive full monetary and injunctive relief, they must
ensure that potential licensors found them. Placing
their works in the databases described was a way to,
yet again, increase the likelihood of potential licensors
finding copyright owners. Take note that a potential
licensor would mostly likely not meet the diligent
effort requirement by simply searching one database,
but many.114 This leads one to believe that a creator
would have to register their work in multiple databases
to facilitate their discovery. The legislation encouraged
copyright owners to comply with more increasingly
burdensome steps to ensure that they are identified and

located along with their work.
The fifth and final explicit requirement of a diligent
search was the performance of actions deemed to be
“reasonable and appropriate” under the circumstances
of the search.115 This last criterion was the one piece
of hope for a rights-holder. If a potential licensor,
during the completion of any of the four minimum
requirements for a diligent search, located any
information about who may own the rights to a work
that information could force the licensor to continue
his search until the investigation has come to a fruitful
end.116 Once the five requirements of the diligent
search were met, however, that did not mean that the
potential licensor, or the owner, was free to do as they
please.
The Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008
also created “recommended practices” for potential
licensors. The recommended practices were intended
to be the ongoing contribution of the United States
Copyright Office to fix the orphan works problem.117
The Copyright Office noted that potential users
desired guidelines to follow when searching for works
and owners in different mediums.118 Recommended
practices would allow the Copyright Office to address
the requirements of the diligent search with more
specificity, guiding licensors to focus on particular
criteria of the diligent search for different types of
works. The Copyright Office, with this requirement,
could determine a de facto database to be explored or
tool to be used in order to meet the diligent search
requirement of S. 2913. The Copyright Office has
investigated potential technologies and databases that
could have made their way into the “recommended
practices,”119 further spelling out criteria for a diligent
search and hinting at locations where copyright owners
should make themselves and their works known to
prevent their works from becoming orphans. With this
power granted to the Copyright Office, the five criteria

106. See Tehranian, supra note 17, at 1430.
107. See U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 104-05.
108. Id. (relying on their experience operating a registration
database for copyrights, they understand a singular system entails
larger costs and burdens than most individuals fail to anticipate).
109. Id. (noting that the ambiguous scope of registrations,
paired with constant evolution in copyrighted works, may not
insure that information in the registry is an effective way of
indentifying or cataloguing the work).
110. Id. at 106 (“[W]e believe that registries are critically
important, if not indispensible, to addressing the orphan works
problem.”).
111. Id.
112. See id. at 105 (acknowledging the traps caused by
mandatory registration systems).
113. S. 2913 § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)(dd).
114. See id.(requiring that a reasonable search be conducted
does not limit the search to one database).

115. S. 2913 § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
116. U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 106 (holding
that a reasonable search would entail efforts to identify, locate and
make contact with any individuals associated with the work who are
probably not the legal owners of any right).
117. See 154 Cong. Rec. S-3437-38 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2008)
(statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch) (noting that the disclosure of
“best practices” for finding the owner of an orphan work will be the
contribution of the Copyright office, which the courts will make
determinations as to if searches are diligent and in good faith).
118. U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 108.
119. Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Balancing the Interest
of Copyright Owners and Users: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of H. Com. on
the Judiciary, supra note 42 (informing the committee of recent
examination of products and databases from Copyright Clearance
Center, Digimarc, Google, InfoFlows, PicScout, PLUS, Audible
Magic and Corbis).
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of the diligent search were suddenly less reliable because
the Copyright Office had the power to expand or
define the reasonable search criteria at will. Following
the roadmap in the statute would no longer be enough.
Lastly, the Act imposed a payment requirement.
The legislation informed the potential licensor that
qualifying searches might require the use of databases
or other technical resources that necessitate a payment
or subscription to use.120 While this element was
clearly directed at the potential user, there was nothing
to indicate that the databases could not charge the
individuals populating the database as well. Some
rights-holders would no doubt be comfortable with
paying to ensure their exclusive rights stay intact, but
others would most likely stay away from using a costly
service. Would database owners find more revenue
charging the potential licensors who want to find the
rights-holders, or charging the rights-holders who just
want to be found? It is not clear how this would have
worked out, especially in the private sector, but when
placed in the hands of unregulated sectors, the potential
ramifications should be noted.
While the intentions of the Shawn Bentley Orphan
Works of 2008 were grand, were they worth the risks
and potential harm placed upon rights-holders? The
informal formalities were a dramatic development and
the limitations on relief were possibly huge, but on a
grander scale, what could have been the ramifications
on copyright law?
VI. Ramifications on Current Copyright Law
The Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008
aimed to address the inadequacies of the U.S. copyright
system, and while it did that, it challenged some longstanding tenets of copyright law. From statute to
case law to international treaty, everything was on the
cutting block to cure orphan works.
The Act would have substantially affected
monetary relief. As the Act made clear, the only
possible monetary relief available to a rights-holder was
“reasonable compensation” in the form of the market
price for the license prior to the infringement.121 In
current copyright infringement cases, reasonable
compensation to a copyright owner would be the
“actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the
infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are
attributable to the infringement and are not taken into
account in computing the actual damages.”122 Prior
to S. 2913, when an infringer used an orphan work,
courts would most likely consider the cost of the license
when the infringement occurred, so it appears the Act
120. S. 2913 § 2(b)(2)(A)(v).
121. Id § 2(c)(1).
122. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b).

would not change the allocation of damages at all. The
only question is whether the Shawn Bentley Orphan
Works Act would have prevented a rights-holder from
receiving the profits attributable to the infringement.
When a reasonable license fee is lost, there is guarantee
to receive profits,123 so it is unclear if rights-holders
would have lost much in actual damages under the
Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act.
Statutory damages are another story. An
individual who previously registered their work with
the Copyright Office, in doing what orphan works
legislation was trying to incentivize,124 stands to lose up
to $150,000 per work in potential damages.125 Absent
this legislation and a lessening of liability, a court would
likely find a potential licensor’s use of an orphan work
to be willful infringement, bringing up to $150,000 in
statutory damages.126 Obviously, judges in such cases
examine the totality of the circumstances to determine
the appropriate award of damages, but losing a
potential $150,000 because of orphan works legislation
is a significant change from current copyright law. This
is especially important because statutory damages are
considered a reward for registering your work.127
Injunctive relief could be rendered non-existent for
orphan works under this legislation as well. Section
502 under current copyright law gives federal courts the
authority to grant reasonable injunctions to prevent or
restrain the infringement of copyrights.128 This can be
more important to the copyright owner than monetary
relief, as injunctive relief is the way for a rights-holder
to protect the integrity of their work. However, under
the orphan works legislation, that option is once again
taken away from the copyright owners by the courts
asserting the payment of reasonable compensation.129
The Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act arguably
would have affected or eliminated Section 201(e) of
123. See On Davis v. The Gap, Inc. 246 F.3d 152, 167 (2d
Cir. 2001) (“[D]ecisions of this and other courts support the view
that the owner’s actual damages may include in appropriate cases
the reasonable license fee on which a willing buyer and a willing
seller would have agreed for the use taken by the infringer.”).
124. See 17 U.S.C. § 412
125. Id. § 504(c)(2); see 17 U.S.C. § 412.
126. Id.; see Island Software & Computer Serv. v. Microsoft
Corp., 413 F.3d 257, 263 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that willful
infringement requires the defendant being aware that they were
infringing another’s copyright).
127. See Derek Andrew, Inc., 528 F.3d at 701 (holding that
because the plaintiff waited almost two years from the date of first
publication to register its copyright, they should not receive the
reward of statutory damages).
128. 17 U.S.C. § 502.
129. S. 2913 § 2(c)(2)(B) (“[A]ny injunctive relief ordered by
the court may not restrain the infringer’s continued preparation or
use of that new work, if the infringer pays reasonable compensation
in a reasonably timely manner.”).
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Title 17 as well. Section 201(e) does not allow any
government body, official or organization to “seize,
expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership
with respect to the copyright, or any exclusive rights
under copyright.”130 Under the orphan works
legislation, the government, by granting “licenses” to
potential users, would have exercised the right of the
copyright holder to grant licenses to all of the exclusive
rights under Section 106.131 Despite the fact that
the government ownership of copyrights is rare,132
the Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act would have
effectively allowed the government to act as if they
owned all the orphan works.
A changing of Section 201(e) leads directly to a
potential changing of the way we view Section 106. If
the government can give any of the Section 106 rights
to a potential licensor without the owner’s consent,
does the owner really have exclusive rights? It is also
unclear what rights a potential licensor would have
been allowed to take as well. The right to create a
derivative work is clearly at the heart of the orphan
works matter, but could it extend to the granting of
a license to simply reproduce the work in the same
manner as it was originally produced? It is unclear
how the courts would handle such a scenario, and
until orphan works legislation is passed, it will remain
unclear.
One of the rights not represented in Section 106,
but that is no less vehemently fought for amongst
copyright owners, is the “right to exclude.” The
right to exclude anyone from licensing has long been
viewed as one of the rights of a copyright owner.133
This legislation would perhaps change the way that
we approach copyright, changing copyright from a
property right into something entirely different.
Finally, the Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act
of 2008 arguably stood in the way of the Berne
Convention and what it was trying to accomplish,
along with many other international copyright treaties.
Despite establishing that “the enjoyment and exercise”
of all rights associated with copyright protection cannot
130. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e).
131. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (transferring the exclusive rights to
reproduce the copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works, to
distribute copies of the work, to perform the work publicly, to
displace the work publicly).
132. See 17 U.S.C § 105 (denying copyright protection
for any work of the United States Government); see Schnapper v.
Foley 667, F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (allowing the government to
acquire ownership of copyrights).
133. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)
(noting that Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 8 of the United States
Constitution granted the right of an author to license their work,
which in turn allows for the owner of a copyright to refuse to
license their work).
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be subject to the completion of some formality, the
United States Congress has always been comfortable
treading a fine line between what is a formality and
what is not.134 The United States does not require an
individual to register their work to receive copyright
protection, a belief that follows the Berne Convention’s
dicta; however, the United States does require
registration if one wants to bring an infringement
action or receive monetary relief for infringement in the
form of statutory damages or attorney’s fees.135 While
the United States has always claimed our registration
system is valid in the face of international treaties,
requiring registration to enforce your copyright has
been deemed by some to have the same effect as forcing
registration for protection in the first place.136 The
Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008 could have
further complicated this scenario by necessitating the
registration of your work with not only the Copyright
Office, but also with other private databases and
directories.137 Not doing so would lead to the potential
loss of your exclusive rights to copyright.138 While
still most likely falling in line with the United States’
rationale that current registries can still function in
the wake of Berne and other international agreements,
this scenario does add more ammunition to the
argument that coerced registration could function as
a true formality. The ramifications of orphan works
legislation have been noted and there is no doubt that
they played a part in this legislation’s demise. The next
question is how bodies other than Congress would treat
solutions to the orphan works problem.
VII. Reactions
The ideologies on the two opposite sides of the
orphan works legislation have been battling for a few
years now. It could be argued that the rights-holders
are “winning” the battle, as legislation has not passed
both houses of Congress, but that also means that
the orphan works problem has been allowed to grow
exponentially for additional years without a legislative
solution. There was, however, a recent attempt at a
private solution.
134. See Tehranian, supra note 17, at 1438-39 (holding
that copyright registration is not a formality when it only affects
copyright remedies and not copyright subsistence).
135. 17 U.S.C. § 411-12.
136. See Tehranian, supra note 17, at 1439 (noting that
copyright owners who did not register their work previous to
infringement are often left to extralegal means to reverse the
infringement, thus eliminating the legal effect of having copyright
protection).
137. S. 2913 § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring potential licensors to
search various databases and directories as required under reasonable
circumstances).
138. See S. 2913 § 2(b)(3).
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In 2004, the Google Corporation undertook
a project to digitally copy books and other written
works, with the eventual purpose that Google users
could search through a book’s text online, amongst
other goals.139 The project was met with a great deal
of resistance from publishers and rights-holders.140
Eventually an agreement was reached between the
Author’s Guild and Google allowing Google to
continue the digitizing books, sell subscriptions to
an electronic books database, sell access to individual
books, and to make other prescribed uses.141 The
settlement would have created a registry of all the
rights-holders of the works scanned in the Google
Books Project.142 Should the owner of the work choose
not to have their previously digitally scanned work
used by Google or not to have their work digitized in
the first place, they could have their book and/or their
records removed from the registry.143 Although this
system seemed like a reasonable agreement amongst
consenting parties, there was a great deal of contention
regarding orphan works.144 While Google was required
to use all reasonable efforts to find the owners of
the works,145 Google would, under the terms of the
agreement, gain the rights to use the orphan works
unless the rights-holder purposefully opted out of the
registry.146
While the Google Books agreement is not
completely analogous to the Shawn Bentley Orphan
Works Act, the similarities between the two scenarios
are worthy to note. These similarities were not lost
on the federal court judge in charge of approving or
denying the settlement, Judge Chin, either, who said
it has been the charge of Congress to further copyright
policy.147 While the issue was in front of him however,
he held that the Google Books settlement was not “fair,
adequate, or reasonable.”148 Judge Chin held that it
is inconsistent with the longstanding purpose of U.S.
copyright law to force rights-holders to come forward
to protect their rights when Google first copied the

139. The Authors Guild, 05 Civ. 8136, slip op. at 2-3.
140. Id. at 4.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 7-8.
143. Id. at 8.
144. Id. at 23-24 (holding that Congress has attempted to
solve the orphan works problem, signifying it may not be the role or
right of a private agreement to do so).
145. Id. at 9.
146. Id. at 32-34.
147. Id. at 23 (“The question of who should be entrusted
with guardianship of orphan books . . . safeguards are matters more
appropriately decided by Congress than through an agreement
among private, self-interested parties.”).
148. Id. at 1.

works without seeking permission.149 In addition, the
judge found it to be very unlikely that most copyright
owners would actually know to come forward to
enforce their copyrights by removing their works from
the registry.150 The court also held that the agreement
would have a massive impact on foreign rights-holders,
who would most likely find it more difficult to receive
notification of what they must do to protect their work
than it would be for U.S. rights-holders.151 Judge Chin
finally took note that foreign digital libraries, which
are in line with international treaty agreements, would
not receive control over orphan works that Google was
trying to obtain with the agreement.152
While the first private attempt at a solution to
the orphan works problem failed in federal court, this
does not mean that a legislative attempt at a similar
solution would not be successful. All the ruling does
is reinforce the basic concept that current copyright
law will in no way provide for a solution to the orphan
works problem. Congress’s changes to copyright law
enabled the orphan works situation, and it is only when
U.S. copyright law changes again that the problem
will disappear; the Shawn Bentley Orphan Works
Act was an attempt at that change. The question is,
is the United States Congress ready to sacrifice many
of the current elements of copyright law to reach that
solution? The Senate was in 2008. Moreover, while
that attempt was meant to shape the actions to be taken
by all copyright holders, that may not have been a bad
thing. In fact, it may have been the right solution for
U.S. copyright law.
VIII. The Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act
Would Have Been Good for the United
States Copyright Market, and Thus Good
for the United States
The Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008
was no doubt a controversial piece of legislation. This
controversy does not necessitate that the legislation be
unsuccessful, does not attempt to incorrectly legislate,
nor does it place the legislation outside of the “goals”
of copyright law. In fact, the Shawn Bentley Orphan
Works Act might have been the most successful attempt
to get the United States back to what copyrights
originally were meant to be and do in the United

149. Id. at 35.
150. Id. at 35-36.
151. Id. at 43-44 (noting the concerns of foreign rightsholders that they are unable to accurately search the records of the
Copyright Office without traveling to Washington, D.C. or paying
a fee of $330).
152. Id. at 45 (noting that the German digital library
“Deutshe Digitale Bibliothek” must still license the rights of orphan
works in order to use them).
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States.153
The solution to the orphan works problem is to
make every rights-holder locatable when an individual
wishes to license the work. It seems clear that the
legislation, with its imposition of informal formalities,
would have done that. Individuals could license
orphan works under certain reasonable search criteria,
and that would in turn encourage current and future
rights-holders to make themselves known to potential
licensors. That is not what makes the legislation
controversial though; what makes this legislation truly
novel and insightful are the requirements that rightsholders must satisfy to maintain their rights. Why
should this be such a controversy though? The greater
controversy might, in fact, be the changes to U.S.
copyright law that led us to the problems in the first
place.
The first copyright law in the United States was
a law populated with formalities to receive copyright
protection. The Copyright Act of 1790 gave copyright
protection (the sole right and liberty of printing,
reprinting, publishing and vending) for 14 years to
any individual who registered their work with the U.S.
government.154 To extend protection another 14 years,
the rights-holder would have to renew their work with
the government again.155 The protection would never
be granted unless individuals deposited a copy of their
work with the government as well.156 From the birth of
this nation, copyright holders were expected to perform
certain actions to receive copyright protection.
The belief that formalities were beneficial and
necessary for copyright protection was held firm in
U.S. law until the implementation of the Copyright
Act of 1976 and the Berne Convention, which
eliminated copyright formalities from U.S. copyright
law. Even as the United States moved away from
copyright formalities, it does not appear that was ever
the true intent of the Copyright Office. The Register
of Copyrights did not approve the instant granting of
copyright protection when Congress looked to revise
copyright law in the 1970s.157 The Register believed
153. See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (noting that the
copyright clause is not meant to benefit individual people, but “to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” for the people).
154. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (protecting only
maps, charts, or books).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 125.
157. Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 333 (citing the Report of the
Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright
Law (1961), available at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Report_
of_the_Register_of_Copyrights_on_the_General_Revision_of_
the_U.S._Copyright_Law (“The Constitution does not establish
copyrights, but provides that Congress shall have the power to grant
such rights if it thinks best. Not primarily for the benefit of the
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that when the public’s interests and the interests of the
artist were to conflict, the interests of the public were of
greater priority.158
Such favoritism of copyright formalities in our
legislative past shows that the United States was
never a nation that treated a copyright as a natural
right.159 One could assume that if a copyright were
a natural right, created upon inception of a work,
an individual would have to do nothing other than
create the work to receive protection.160 Instead, the
U.S. Government traditionally viewed copyrights
as a government-granted monopoly over the rights
associated with a work.161 It was the “thinkers” and
authors of treatises who instead believed in the “natural
rights of authorship,” viewing formalities as hurdles in
the path of that right.162 Therefore, while the “thinkers”
and most Western European countries believed that
copyrights were natural rights,163 the United States
continued to legislate and adjudicate that copyrights
were government-granted monopolies, subject to the
strictest formalities.164
By acknowledging the United States’ rationale
on copyright’s origins and what was required to
receive them, one can foresee the potential problems
that the United States would have by eliminating
copyright formalities to fall in line with international
conventions. The U.S. copyright system was based
on the principle that someone must do more than
simply create the work to own a copyright in it. So
when Congress decided to retreat from that principle,
problems arose, the most significant being orphan
works. Recognizing this problem, Congress attempted
to re-impose the formalities through the creation of
informal formalities in the Shawn Bentley Orphan
Works Act. Forced to function in between U.S.
copyright principles and international beliefs, orphan
author, but primarily for the benefit of the public, such rights are
given.”).
158. See id.
159. See id. at 319
160. See id. at 318-19 (noting that the imposition of
formalities reflects the concept that creating a work alone does not
justify protection).
161. See id. (holding that a government-granted monopoly
would most likely require the copyright holder to meet certain
requirements to receive the copyright).
162. See id. at 320.
163. See also Circular 38A: International Copyright Relations of
the United States, 1 (Nov. 2010) (noting that France, Germany, the
United Kingdom, Italy, Portugal, and Spain agreed to the Berne
Convention, and subsequent elimination of copyright formalities,
in the 19th century).
164. See Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 320-21 (recognizing
that federal legislation and subsequent federal court decisions that
enforced the “highly restricted view of copyright” that prevailed
throughout the 19th century in the United States).
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works legislation danced the fine line between freely
granting copyrights and asking owners to do more
than simply create. Orphan works legislation simply
acknowledged that the United States has always treated
copyrights differently than most of the world, and that
formalities, albeit informal, will be necessary.
IX. The Next Step for Orphan Works Legislation
So where can we go from here? All attempts at
legislation have failed. It does not appear that another
attempt at solving the orphan works problem will
be made in the current political climate. If another
attempt were made though, some changes could make
the solution more amiable for all.
A simplification of the proposed legislation could
go far to increase the likelihood that orphan works
legislation would be passed. Referring back to the
proposed statutory language from the Copyright
Office’s Report on Orphan Works, the legislation
would call for a “reasonably diligent search to locate the
infringed copyright” when “performed in good faith.”165
There were no criteria for specialized databases to be
searched or for tools to be used, not even a mandatory
search of the Copyright Office Registry.166 Instead, the
legislation required only a diligent search.167 This could
lessen the formalistic requirements placed on every
rights-holder while still encouraging preemptive actions
to make themselves known to potential licensors. The
searches would still be required, and a possible loss of
exclusive rights might occur, but no longer would the
rights-holders be told where their works should go. By
giving creators more control over their own works and
how they are to make themselves known to the world,
rights-holders are given more freedom to protect their
works as they see fit. All that would be required to
accomplish this is a simplification of the legislation’s
language.
By not statutorily defining the criteria for a
diligent search, Congress would not be limiting itself
to specific ways that potential licensors could find
the owners of works. The Report on Orphan Works
spoke of the rise of new tools to identify and protect
works168; however, the Shawn Bentley Orphan Works
Act attempted to require the use of these tools before
it was known what tools would prove useful in the first
place169. The Report on Orphan Works frequently
165. U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 127.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 104 (noting that the growth in technology,
particularly internet based technology, would factor into what
qualified as a reasonable search as it would be much easier to
identify and locate authors).
169. See S. 2913 § 514(b)(2)(A)(ii)(requiring specific steps to
be taken to qualify as a diligent search).

emphasized the need for flexibility in defining what
constitutes a reasonable search.170 By eliminating the
factors of a diligent search (records of the Copyright
office, technological tools, appropriate databases, etc.),
Congress would encourage the development of new
resources to find rights-holders instead of forcing those
resources to fall into specific categories.
The elimination of the diligent search criteria could
also encourage the development of a more reasonable
diligent search. The Report on Orphan Works
acknowledged the prevalence of “private users” who
wished to obtain a license to use an orphan work.171
These private users would be the least likely to use the
orphan work for commercial benefit and it could be
assumed that they also had limited funds to conduct a
diligent search. Such uses would harm rights-holders
the least, and yet orphan works legislation still required
every potential user to complete every step of the
diligent search. Despite the limited impact of private
users on the licensing market, the licensors would still
be required to conduct ineffective searches of copyright
records, occasionally paying Copyright Office staff to
conduct such a search in addition to potentially paying
for expert assistance or the right to use technological
databases.172 Such monetary requirements would
still deter private users from appropriating orphan
works, and the deterrence of the least harmful uses
of orphan works is antithetical to the purpose of the
legislation.173 The elimination of diligent search criteria
would no doubt facilitate the use of orphan works by
private users, a goal that is supposedly the focus of this
legislation.174
Finally, instead of mandating specific search
criteria for a potential licensor175, future legislation
should address the factors that courts would use to
170. U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 104.
171. Id. at 125. (noting the prevalence of individuals wishing
to reproduce old family photographs).
172. S. 2913 § 514(b)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring searches of the
records of the Copyright Office, technological databases, and the
use of expert assistance to conduct a reasonable search).
173. See U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 38-40 (noting
that small-time users would might be willing to pay small fees to
use a work, but only if it would ensure finding the owner of the
copyright).
174. U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 8 (asserting that
the first goal of orphan works legislation was to create a system that
would make it more likely for users to find a relevant rights-holder
and negotiated a license agreement and recognizing that the second
goal was to encourage use of orphan works only when the rightsholder could not be found).
175. See id. (requiring that every diligent search entail a search
of the records of the Copyright Office, as search of available sources
of copyright authorship, the use of appropriate technological
tools while searching, and the use of appropriate databases while
searching).
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determine if a reasonable search actually occurred. The
Report on Orphan Works acknowledged that what is a
reasonable search in certain circumstances might not be
a reasonable search in others.176 The reasonability of a
search would often depend on numerous factors, which
would have to be balanced by the courts.177 Arguably,
the most important factor to determine reasonability is
the nature and extent of the use.178 The Report stressed
that the more commercial the use of an orphan work
by the potential licensor, the greater the effort the
licensor must expend in finding the rights-holder.179
This factor will truly protect the rights-holder, as the
potential licensor’s search for rights-holders, while
intending to profit, would be scrutinized for good faith
and diligence. Orphan works legislation must focus
upon this factor in order to persuade rights-holders that
they will be sufficiently protected from licensors who
stand to benefit from attempting to skirt the reasonable
search requirements, or those licensors who perform
the bare minimum when conducting the search.
Instead of establishing strict diligent search criteria for
the licensor, orphan works legislation should establish
statutory factors that courts will use to determine the
reasonability of the search, with the nature and extent
of the use being the most influential. Such a statutory
construction has proven to be effective in the past, with
federal courts embracing and shaping the four factors
of copyright fair use.180 By giving the courts factors
that would shape what constitutes a reasonable search
instead of strictly defining it, the legislation could be
friendlier to both parties involved. The private users
who wish to license orphan works would, in theory,
not be forced to waste money on costly and ineffective
searches. The rights-holders should, in turn, be able
to make themselves known as much or as little as
they would choose. They could choose to identify
themselves everywhere, likely increasing that odds that
every licensor would find them, or they could choose
to put themselves in only a few small places, hopefully
allowing those who truly wished to profit off their work
would find them, letting the private users with limited
means use the orphan work freely. This flexibility is
essential for orphan works legislation to succeed.
By simplifying orphan works legislation and
replacing the diligent search criteria with the factors

of a reasonably diligent search, a more flexible, and
therefore workable, standard will be created. Such a
standard will assuage the fears of rights-holders and
make orphan works legislation easier to pass, all the
while accomplishing the goals of previous orphan works
legislation.
X. Conclusion
There seems to be unanimous agreement that
orphan works are a devastating problem for copyright
law; however, there is no agreement as to what should
be done about them. The most recent legislative
attempt at fixing that problem, the Shawn Bentley
Orphan Works Act of 2008, was novel, but by creating
informal formalities, the bill might have been doomed
from the start. When you look at the beginnings of
copyright protection in the United States though,
the idea behind informal formalities seems to fall
in line with the country’s goals. The United States,
through legislation and common law, has always
treated a copyright as something that is earned, not
freely given. It is with this goal in mind that Congress
must continue to shape its orphan works legislation,
perhaps by eliminating search criteria and instead
creating factors for courts to use in determining what
constitutes a reasonable search. By taking these actions,
Congress may be able to eliminate orphan works and
establish the copyright license market as a functional
part or our national economy.

176. U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 98.
177. Id. at 98-108 (holding that the reasonability of a search
would be shaped by identifying information on the work itself, the
public nature of the work, age of the work, whether indentifying
information exists in publically available records, and the status of
the author).
178. See id. at 107-08.
179. See id.
180. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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